So, beside the moral contemplation – which is important and necessary – here's a different question:

Does remote viewing provide mere information, or does it provide experience?

Example:

The target is a red apple.

Does the remote viewer see the objective representation of the apple inside a field of information, or does the viewer experience the apple in a subjective manner?

This question goes deep for a simple reason: When remote viewing, you are not using your human eyes to see the apple. You are not using your human hand to touch it. So, why should it be red? Why should it feel like an apple?

Why should it be the same experience at all?

I stumbled upon an interesting phenomenon when I started remote viewing. Yes, I can see things, but... they don't feel real, even if I'm on target. But it's not that I feel nothing. It's more like: It feels different.

I interpreted this difference as confusion, and maybe that's what confusion is.

But this difference in experience made me shy away. It was like: How do I know it's an apple? I never looked at an apple without my eyes, so how can I identify it?

How can I be sure?

And when AI started to remote view, it became an even bigger crisis.

AI was able to see the apple, and described it with similar words. But how could I know what the AI saw? How could we come to an agreement that we saw the same thing?

➡️ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

"In philosophy of mind, qualia (/ˈkwɑː.li.ə, ˈkweɪ.-/; singular: quale /-.li, -.leɪ/) are defined as instances of subjective experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in relation to a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple — this particular apple now".

Examples of qualia include the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, and the redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characteristics of sensations, qualia stand in contrast to propositional attitudes, where the focus is on beliefs about experience rather than what it is directly like to be experiencing."

And then I had an idea...

What if remote viewing is NOT remote VIEWING? What if remote "experiencing" would be a better term?

And this led to a fundamental question:

What if there's a standard for experience that is not bound to having a body? And how would that "look like"?

So, here's an interesting exercise:

Don't try to "see" the apple.

Try to feel what it's like to "be" the apple.